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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HOLLEN DAVID FAUGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 45853
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-25361

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Hollen D. Faught pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, the district
court sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment, with five years fixed. Mr. Faught appeals,
and he asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State alleged Mr. Faught committed the crimes of felony driving under the influence
of alcohol (“DUI”) and driving without a driver’s license. (R., pp.21–22 (amended complaint).)
Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offenses and bound
Mr. Faught over to district court. (R., pp.19–20, 24–23.) The State then filed an Information
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charging him with both offenses. (R., pp.28–29.) Shortly thereafter, the State filed Part II of the
Information to add the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.37–38.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Faught pled guilty to the felony DUI and
the sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.5, Ls.11–17, p.15, L.11–p.19, L.9.) The State agreed to
dismiss the other change. (Tr., p.5, Ls.16–17.) The State also agreed to recommend a sentence of
twenty years, with seven years fixed. (Tr., p.5, Ls.14–15.)
At sentencing, the State made a recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.14–19.) Mr. Faught requested a sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed,
and a period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.29, Ls.6–10.) The district court sentenced him to
twenty years in prison, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.36, L.23–p.37, L.4.) The district court
declined to retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.37, Ls.10–16.) Mr. Faught timely appealed from the district
court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.69–71, 73–74.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of twenty years,
with five years fixed, upon Mr. Faught, following his DUI guilty plea?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Twenty
Years, With Fixed Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Faught, Following His DUI Guilty Plea
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Faught’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), (9) (ten-year maximum), 19-2514 (five-year mandatory
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minimum, maximum of life). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Mr. Faught “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). “The
primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to gain additional
information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation.”
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate objective of a
defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 677. The district court’s decision to retain
jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of discretion in a
trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon
which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.” Id.
In this case, Mr. Faught asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or retained jurisdiction in light
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of the mitigating factors, including his mental health issues, severe alcoholism, and family
support.
Mr. Faught’s significant mental health condition stands in favor of mitigation. Idaho
Code § 19-2523 requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health condition
if it is a significant factor, and the record must show that the sentencing court adequately
considered this factor when imposing a sentence. I.C. § 19-2523; Delling, 152 Idaho at 132–33.
Here, sixty-two-year-old Mr. Faught has lived with schizophrenia for almost his entire life.
(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.14.) He started to hear voices in his head as a child.
(PSI, pp.14, 477–78.) His childhood was “confusing” and school was “always hard” because he
heard voices. (PSI, p.476.) As a child, he did not realize that hearing voices was not normal.
(PSI, p.476.) About three years ago, Mr. Faught “finally got sick of it” and saw a physician. (PSI,
p.478.) Mr. Faught was prescribed Haldol. (PSI, p.478.) He reported that the voices are “quieter”
when he is on the medication. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Faught’s severe mental health issues support a
lesser sentence.
Related to his mental health condition, Mr. Faught suffers from severe alcohol use
disorder. (PSI, pp.477, 480.) Mr. Faught’s alcohol abuse issues, the impact of his alcohol abuse
on his behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court
should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of alcohol abuse on the defendant’s criminal
conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v.
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Mr. Faught first drank alcohol at age thirteen and
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 482-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
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consistently drank alcohol at age eighteen or nineteen. (PSI, pp.476–77.) He acknowledged that
he drinks too much. (PSI, p.14.) He reported that he currently uses alcohol to feel “normal” due
to Haldol’s side effects. (PSI, p.478.) Mr. Faught’s alcohol addiction also supports a lesser
sentence.
Finally, Mr. Faught has the support of his family. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–
95 (1982) (family support and good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658,
663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered family and friend support as mitigating
circumstance). Mr. Faught’s family is very supportive of him. (PSI, p.17.) He lives in a trailer
park in Garden City, and two of his sisters also live there. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Faught speaks with his
sisters on a regular basis. (PSI, p.17.) He plans to return to his trailer, which he owns, upon his
release. (PSI, pp.12, 475.) One of his sisters stated that Mr. Faught was “a great guy when he is
on his meds and not drinking.” (PSI, p.12.) He enjoys walking and fishing. (PSI, p.12.) He also
receives social security benefits for his mental health issues. (PSI, pp.13, 475.) These positive
aspects of Mr. Faught’s life, such as his family support, are strong mitigating factors.
In summary, Mr. Faught maintains the district abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. The mitigating factors here show that Mr. Faught can be successful in the
community with proper treatment for his mental health condition and substance abuse disorder.
Proper consideration of these mitigating factors support a lesser sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Faught respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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